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A critical appraisal of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis: 
Does the real rate of return on money matter for investment in 
developing countries?  
  
 
SUMMARY 
 
McKinnon’s (1973) complementarity hypothesis predicts that money and investment are 
complementary due to self-financed investment, so that a real deposit rate is the key 
determinant of capital formation for developing economies.  This paper critically appraises 
this contention by conducting a vigorous empirical approach using panel data for 107 
developing countries.  The long-run and dynamic estimation results based on McKinnon’s 
theoretical model are supportive of the hypothesis.  However, when the investment model is 
conditioned by such factors as financial development, different income levels across 
developing countries, external inflows, public finance and trade constraints, the credibility of 
the hypothesis is undermined.   
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1. INTROCUTION 
The argument for self-financed capital formation within financially constrained developing 
economies led McKinnon (1973) to develop a complementarity hypothesis, whereby high 
real rates of return on money bring about the accumulation of real money balances, and these, 
in turn, finance the costly, indivisible fixed physical capital.  The hypothesis formulates a 
dual process, in which the demand for real money balances depends directly, inter alia, on 
the average real return on capital, and the investment ratio to GDP rises with the real interest 
rate on deposits.  This process provided a plausible empirical framework for researchers to 
analyse investment decisions and the demand for money function for developing countries.  
Most of the literature engages in a single equation framework, either in a money or in an 
investment equation.  For example, DeMelo and Tybout (1986), Edwards (1988) and 
Morriset (1993) focused on the investment equation, whereas Harris (1979) and Thornton and 
Poudyal (1990) modelled the demand for money function.   The study of Fry (1978), Laumas 
(1990), Thornton (1990) and Khan and Hasan (1998) tested the complementarity hypothesis 
by estimating both investment (or savings) and the demand for money functions. Pentecost 
and Moore (2006) investigated the interdependence between the investment and money legs 
of the joint hypothesis in a simultaneous system of equations for India.  Overall, whether the 
coverage of a sample country is either a single country or a group of several countries, the 
empirical literature tends to support the complementarity hypothesis.   
 This paper critically appraises McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis by 
conducting a vigorous empirical approach using panel data for 107 developing countries with 
the sample period of 1970 to 2006.  First, we test a panel cointegration for the key variables 
of money, investment, real return on money, aggregate income and credit.  The presence of 
cointegration is a pre-requisite for the acceptance of the hypothesis.  Secondly, the long run 
relationship is modelled in a panel system of equations, followed by an error correction 
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dynamic model.  We then extend the theoretical model by conditioning the investment 
behaviour by incorporating the effect of financial development, different income levels across 
developing countries, external inflows, trade constraints and public finance.  These variables 
are mostly predicted to increase capital formation independently of the hypothesis.    
We find a cointegration relationship among the key variables, which provides a 
necessary condition for the complementarity hypothesis.   The long-run and dynamic 
estimates are supportive, too, since we find a statistically significant effect of return on 
capital on the demand for money model, and also a significant positive impact of real deposit 
rates on investment.  Evidence also reveals that financial development and the status of 
having a middle-income level among developing economies are factors, which reduce self-
financed capital formation by mitigating financial constraints.  The conditional variables are 
found to boost the economy by accumulating physical capital independently of the self-
finance hypothesis.  Although real deposit rates are found to be statistically significant, even 
after augmenting the investment model with the conditional variables, the size of the 
coefficients significantly declines, undermining the credibility of self-financed capital 
formation.  The empirical result highlights the key role of financial intermediation through 
the conduit of credit for increased capital formation. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, McKinnon’s (1973) 
complementarity hypothesis is specified. Section 3 describes the data employed for 
estimation, and Section 4 spells out the panel unit root and cointegration tests.  Long-run and 
dynamic models are estimated in Section 5.  In Section 6, the investment long-run model is 
augmented with conditional variables.  Section 7 concludes. 
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2. McKINNON’S COMPLEMENTARITY HYPOTHESIS 
McKinnon (1973) asserts self-finance and lump-sum expenditure or indivisibilities of  
investment for financially-constrained developing countries, hence investors are obliged to 
accumulate money balances prior to their investment project.  Meanwhile, in many 
developing countries, the decades of high budget deficits have resulted in high domestic 
borrowings by the government, forcing them to lower their borrowing costs.  Consequently, 
government securities at low interest rates became one of the major causes of financial 
repression, where interest rates were set by administrative decision, and they were likely to be 
below market-determined levels (Fry 1980).  McKinnon emphasises that the removal or 
relaxation of the administered interest rates would boost capital formation, since high deposit 
rates attract the accumulation of money, and stimulate investment.        
 The complementarityy hypothesis is examined using money and investment models.  
First, the demand for real money balances (M/P) depends positively upon real income, Y , the 
own real rate of interest on bank deposits, d - πe  (d = deposit rates and πe = expected rate of 
inflation), and the real average return on capital, c.  The positive association between the 
average real return on physical capital and the demand for money balances represents the 
complementarity between capital and money as given by (time scripts are omitted for 
simplicity). 
)d,c,Y(P/M e   000 
 edcY
,,

  (1) 
The equation (1) suggests that the demand for money is given not only by the transactions 
motive of holding cash, but also by the need to finance real capital formation in countries  
where institutional credit or alternative finance are constrained.  There is also the need to 
hedge against inflation in such a way as to preserve the real value of money balances.  
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 The complementarity works in both directions: money supply has a first order impact 
in determining investment, hence complementarity can be accomplished by specifying an 
investment function given by: 
)d,c(FY/I e    0,0 
 edc
FF

   (2) 
The investment to income ratio, I/Y, must be positively related to the real rate of return on 
money balances. This is because if a rise in the real return on bank deposits, d - πe ,  raises the 
demand for money, and real money balances are complementary to investment, it must also 
lead to a rise in the investment ratio.  The complementarity hypothesis specifically requires 
that  00 
 edc
Fand

1
.  
 McKinnon’s model is, however, restrictive in that it is assumed that there is no 
intermediation by financial institutions between saving (money includes current and time 
savings) and the creation of credit.  This is very unlikely, even in under-developed financial 
markets.    Since the indirect effect of real deposit rates on investment is due, not only to self-
finance, but also to the credit creation from money, where the real supply of credit increases 
pari passu money demand (Fry 1980).   Moreover, the level of credit may contain two types 
of information about the process of financial intermediation.  First, changes in credit may reflect 
the ability of financial intermediaries to make loans perhaps due to changes in monetary policy. 
In this case, firms, which are unable to obtain funds in the capital market, may become credit-
constrained, leading to lower levels of investment.   Second, changes in credit may reflect 
shocks to the intermediation system itself.  In particular, financial liberalisation, undertaken in 
many developing countries, initiates  various forms of deregulation of financial markets, the 
creation of financial innovations, or perhaps changes in the solvency of borrowers or lenders; 
these have implications for economic activity that may be transmitted through changes in the 
quantity of credit (Mallick and Moore 2008).  In this respect, the availability of credit to 
business will affect the investment ratio independently of the self-finance motive for holding 
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money, hence the variable of ‘credit’ can be specified in the investment equation.  By 
specifying credit along with the real rates of deposit in the investment equation, two channels 
of funding sources could be identified: one is self-finance portrayed by the effect of real 
deposit rates, and the other channel is through credit intermediated by financial institutions.    
 From an empirical perspective, it is impossible to compute a sensible measure of the 
real return on physical capital across countries.  Hence, following Khan and Hasan (1998), 
Laumas (1998) and Pentecost and Moore (2006), it is proxied by the investment to income 
ratio, I/Y, which is likely to vary directly with the average real return on capital
2
.  The models 
now become: 
),/,(/ edyiypm         (3) 
),(/ dcdfyi e        (4) 
where m/p= ln(M/P), i/y=ln(I/Y) and y=ln(Y/P).  dc is the ratio between  domestic credit to 
private sector and GDP.  The models (3) and (4) form a basis for empirical estimation.   
 
3. DATA 
The data set used to estimate models (3) and (4) is the annual data of 107 developing 
countries covering the period 1970 to 2006.  The time series per country contain a minimum 
of 7 years in sequence.  See Appendix 1 for country details.  Note that the study covers more 
than 70% of all developing countries, with a total of 149 countries classified as developing 
countries based on 2006 GNI per capita.   
 Broad money (M) includes money and quasi money (demand and time deposits), and 
the deposit rates (d) are the rates paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or 
savings deposits.  The consumer price index (p) is used as the deflator for nominal GDP (Y) 
and the broad money stock, and it is also used to compute inflation.  Note that some 
observations of extremely volatile real deposit rates (d - πe) are excluded from the empirical 
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analysis
3
.  The capital formation for the private sector (I) is derived from the gross fixed 
capital formation
4
.  Expected inflation in d-πe   is not directly observable.  For a volatile rate 
of inflation in developing economies, where the future prediction of the variable is extremely 
difficult, an autoregressive type of expectation seems to be reasonable.  We take a naïve 
expectation, i.e. t
e
t  1
5
.  All these data are taken from World Development Indicators.  
The descriptive statistics are found in Appendix 2.   
 
4. PANEL UNIT ROOT AND COINTEGRATION TESTS 6 
The complementarity hypothesis predicts the linkage between money and investment, and 
that the dependent and independent variables in equations (3) and (4) are likely to form a 
stable long-run relationship, hence, we carried out unit root and cointegration tests.         
For unit root tests, Fisher’s (1932) ADF and PP tests proposed by Maddala and Wu 
(1999) would fit for unbalanced panel data.  Maddala and Wu (1999) assume individual unit 
root processes, and combine the p-values from individual unit root tests.  We also conducted 
two other types of panel unit root tests, developed by Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) 
for the robustness check.  Levin et al. (2002) assume that there is a common unit root process 
so that coefficients on the lagged dependent variables are homogeneous across cross-sections.  
In contrast, Im et al. (2003) allow for heterogeneity of the coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable with the slope coefficients to vary across cross-sections.  Based on these 
tests, we found that the variables of m/p, dc and y  were characterised as integrated of order 
one, I(1), whereas  i/y and d-πe   were stationary, i.e. I(0).     
For a panel cointegration test, Fisher (1932) derives a combined test that uses the 
results of the individual independent tests, and Maddala and Wu (1999) extend Fisher’s test 
by developing a Johansen panel cointegration test, which combines tests from individual 
cross-sections for the full panel.  If ωi  is the p-value from an individual cointegration test for 
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cross-section i, then under the null hypothesis for the panel, we have .   
The trace and maximum eigenvalue tests suggests that there are four cointegrating vectors 
found at the conventional significance level
7
.  Note that the inclusion of I(0) variables (i.e. i/y 
and d-πe ) appears to have increased the number of cointegration vectors, since each I(0) 
variable is stationary by itself, and it forms a linearly independent combination of the 
variables, which is stationary.  The presence of cointegration suggests that there is a long-run 
stable relationship existing amongst these variables.  If real deposit rates affect money, which 
in turn affects credit and hence investment, then the cointegration relationship is a 
conventional standard result.  If there is a direct effect of money on the formation of physical 
capital, the presence of cointegration is a prerequisite for the complementarity hypothesis
8
.      
 
5. LONG-RUN AND DYNAMIC ERROR-CORRECTION MODEL 
(a) Long-run model 
In panel estimations, the existence of unobservable determinants can be decomposed into a 
country-specific term and a common term for developing countries.  The unobservable 
country-specific determinants can be taken into account in the estimation procedure, and 
models (3) and (4) respectively become:  
m/p it = ßi,0 +  ß1yi,t+ ß2i/yit + ß3 (d-π
e
)it + εit     (5) 
i/y it = αi,0 +  α1  (d-π
e
)it + α2  dcit +  εit     (6) 
ßi,0  and αi,0  are a  time-invariant individual country effect term and εit is an error term
9
.  It is 
possible that country specific terms improved the estimates by absorbing country specific 
errors and  reducing heteroskedasticity. 
The cross-country regressions are subject to endogeneity problems.  For example, the 
correlation between real deposit rates and money could arise from an endogenous 
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determination of real rates, that is, real rates themselves may be influenced by innovations in 
the stochastic process governing the variable of money.  Also, any omitted factors may 
increase both real rates and money simultaneously.   In these circumstances there would exist 
a correlation between real deposit rates and the country-specific error terms in equation (5), 
which would bias the estimated coefficients.  The endogeneity problem can be mitigated by 
applying instrument variable (IV) techniques.  A good instrument would be a variable which 
is highly correlated with regressors,  but not with the error terms.  We use the lagged values 
of regressors and dependent variables in each equation.   Besides, money is included as an 
instrument variable in the investment equation, and credit is in the money equation.  This is 
not only due to the complementarity consideration, but also for the following reasons:  Under 
disequilibrium financial conditions, where real deposit rates could be administered, being 
below equilibrium level, real credit supply is determined by real money demand and there is 
likely to be little direct feedback mechanism from investment demand to real credit.  As there 
is limited supply (of savings), the volume of investment is determined solely by conditions of 
supply.  In this respect, the use of money, as an instrument variable deals with any 
simultaneous equation bias in the investment estimate.  However, where interest rate ceilings 
are relaxed or removed, a larger demand for investible funds will elicit an increase in quantity 
supplied through higher returns to savers.  This consideration dictates the inclusion of credit 
as an instrument variable in the money equation. 
By using IV techniques, we estimate the models in two ways: one is in a single 
equation framework, where money and investment are modelled separately, and the other is 
in a system of simultaneous equations, where both equations are simultaneously estimated.  
The estimates of the long-run models are shown in Table 1.  An estimator that uses lags as 
instruments under the assumption of white noise errors would lose its consistency if, in fact, 
the errors were serially correlated
10
.  It is, therefore, essential to satisfy oneself that this is not 
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the case by reporting test statistics of the validity of the instrument variables.  We present the 
first and second order residual serial correlation coefficients and the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions together with the Breusch-Pagan-Godfray heteroskedasticity test.  We 
also conducted the residual-based panel coingegration test of Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Kao 
(1999) for each single equation
11
.  It is found that these residuals are I(0), and the evidence of 
stationarity seems to steer clear of ‘spurious’ regression.        
[Table 1 around here] 
The signs of all the coefficients agree with a priori expectations with a statistical 
significance, except for the real deposit rate in the system of money equation, which fails to 
reach the 5% significance level.  In general, the magnitude of the coefficients is larger in the 
single equation, as compared with that in the system equation.  The investment model shows 
a remarkably similar size of coefficients between the system and single equations.   
 The positive relationship of the demand for money with the level of aggregate income 
accords with the transactions demand for money hypothesis.  The sizes of the coefficient at 
1.39 and 0.86 in the single and system equations respectively are quite plausible, being closer 
to those found in the empirical literature on the demand for money for developing 
economies
12
.  The positive impact of  the investment income ratio on money supports the 
assumption of self-finance and indivisibility.  Thus where self-finance is important, a rise in 
i/y increases m/p.  The estimated coefficient suggests that one percentage point increase in the 
investment ratio would increase the real money stock by about 0.16 to 0.19 percentage points.  
In the investment model, it is evident that the availability of credit raises the investment ratio, 
and the positive relationship with d-πe highlights the importance of high real rates of interest 
for capital accumulation.  A crucial finding is the significant positive sign on i/y in the money 
function and d-πe in the investment function, which provide robust empirical support for the 
complementarity hypothesis according to McKinnon’s (1973) theory.   
11 
 
 Financial repression is deemed to be the holding of institutional interest rates, 
particularly of deposit rates of interest, below their market equilibrium levels.  Our empirical 
evidence reveals that under disequilibrium interest rate conditions, higher deposit rates raise 
capital formation via the increase in real money balances, where money is defined broadly to 
include savings.  The supply of credit is also dependent on the increased deposit rates, yet if 
there is a credit control prevalent
13
 and if we also consider such factors as external inflows 
and international trade in developing economies, there is a limitation in treating it as solely a 
direct consequence of the increased rates
14
.  In this respect, the positive influence of deposit 
rates on investment is intuitive in terms of self-financed fixed capital, and proves to be a 
credible  sign of the complementarity hypothesis.  
[Table 2 around here] 
For a comparative study, we present selected studies of the complementarity 
hypothesis in Table 2, where the estimates of level feedback are available in a similar model 
specification to that of this paper
15
.  The income elasticity (y) ranges from 0.45 to 1.17 in the 
literature and our estimates are quite comparable.  The magnitude of the coefficient of 
investment ratio in our model is closer to that of Odhiambo (2005) for South Africa.  As to 
real deposit rates, the existing literature tends to show either  a very low magnitude of 
coefficients in both money and investment models, or even insignificant coefficients (see 
Khan and Hasan 1998 and Laumas 1990).  This appears to indicate some difficulty in 
obtaining a well-determined estimate of d-πe .  In the i/y model of this paper, the coefficients 
are 0.0054 to 0.0042, which are similar to that found in Pentecost and Moore (2006). 
 
(b) Dynamic error correction model 
In order to ascertain the credibility of the long-run estimates, we investigate the dynamic 
behaviour of the demand for money and investment.  Dynamic modelling in a system of 
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equations is, however, not practically plausible with the small sample size in terms of time 
series relative to the number of explanatory variables: for example, a total of sixteen variables 
with one lag for each explanatory variable are to be simultaneously solved.  Also note that, in 
general, there is not a sizeable difference in estimates between the system and single 
equations in Table 1 in the long-run model.  Hence, we estimate the dynamic model in a 
single equation using the IV technique.     
[Table 3 around here] 
Tables 3 presents the dynamic, error correction model.  The lagged error correction 
terms (et-1), which are the residuals taken from the single equation of the long-run model, are 
specified along with the other explanatory variables by taking one lag for each.  The 
respective error correction terms are found to be highly significant in each equation with the 
correct negative sign, indicating the appropriateness of the identified long-run relationships. 
 The explanatory variables are statistically and theoretically well-determined in the 
money equation: the level feedback from income, investment and real rates of interest is 
correctly signed.  Similarly, in the dynamic investment model, the level feedback is 
statistically significant with a correct sign.  The results overall seem to reinforce those of the 
long-run model.   
 
6.  AUGMENTED INVESTMENT MODEL 
In the seminal work of McKinnon (1973), government fiscal action has little role in affecting 
directly aggregate capital accumulation, since public policy is limited to control of the real 
return on holding money (i.e. d-πe).  Further restrictions apply to the simplified assumptions 
about investment in small self-financing domestic enterprises.  The models described are also 
derived from the assumptions for a closed economy, even though empirical material is 
usually drawn from small open economies
16
, where their rates of capital formation are 
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unlikely to be determined solely by tiny self-financing units.  Many developing countries are 
highly dependent on foreign trade and are open to corporate investment from abroad.  Hence, 
a rise in investment may not be always due to a rise in the savings ratio when foreign trade or 
foreign capital flows are brought into the picture.  McKinnon (1973) also fails to take account 
of the effect of financial development and the different income levels across countries, as 
these are treated as being constant.  We relax these restrictions by augmenting the long-run 
investment models with several factors, which are likely to contribute to the share of 
financing in domestic capital formation.   
 Firstly, we consider financial development, which bring about financial innovation 
and eases some of the restrictions in the capital market, widening the scope for alternative 
investment opportunities, and removing barriers to entry for foreign banks.  This is likely to 
impact on the transmission mechanism between deposit rates and investment.  As a proxy 
variable, we explicitly include the development of the stock market and of broad money
17
.  
The latter may represent a deepening of the financial sector
18
.  Secondly, the model is 
designed to reflect the different levels of income across developing countries.  Depending on 
the level of institutional capability, on bureaucratic efficiency, on technological capability 
and on the quality of labour, deposit rates may affect investment differently. Assuming that 
these factors are, though in a crude manner, subsumed in the level of income, the estimation 
is conducted by taking dummy variables for two groups of low and upper-middle income 
countries to see if there is any difference in the linkage
19
.   
 Thirdly, external flows such as FDI (foreign direct investment) and ODA (official 
development assistance)  are likely to affect capital formation independently of the level of 
real deposit rates.   Foreign capital takes various forms.  FDI implies long-term investment 
consisting of not only capital per se, but also management skill, know-how and technology, 
and FDI transmits technological diffusion from developed to developing countries, raising 
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capital formation (Balasubramanyam et al. 1999 and Borensztein et al. 1998).   Short-term 
foreign capital flows include portfolio investment and foreign bank lending.  FDI is specified 
separately from short-term foreign loans, since the latter depend on the development of 
domestic financial markets, thus it is assumed to be captured through the variable of credit
20
.  
ODA includes aid or concessional funds from such institutions as the IMF and the World 
Bank, and distinguishes itself from FDI, therefore ODA is shown as a separate entry in the 
model.  Fourthly, we address the extent to which public spending is transmitted into capital 
and production.  We condition investment decisions in the private sector by considering the 
improvement of infrastructure or the purchase of public capital
21
.  Lastly, some attention is 
paid by the literature to foreign trade constraints on economic growth.  Openness and trade 
policy are important for productivity spill-over and the cost of capital goods.  More open 
economies have experienced faster productivity growth (Edwards 1998 and Diao et al. 2005), 
and developing countries can boost their productivity by importing a larger variety of 
intermediate products and capital equipment which embody foreign knowledge (Coe et al. 
1997).  A variable of foreign trade is  added as a conditional instrument.   
The augmented investment model is then given by: 
),,(/ vdcdfyi e         (7) 
where v  is the vector of additional explanatory variables:  fdit (financial development), FDIit, 
ODAit, git (government expenditure) , tradeit (foreign trade)  and income dummy for low and 
upper-middle income groups. fd and income dummy are specified as an interaction with real 
deposit rates.  Financial development is the sum of the ratios of stock market capitalization, 
M2 and domestic credit to GDP.  FDI,  ODA, foreign trade, and government expenditure are 
all percentages of GDP.   The country-income groups can be found in Appendix 2.  The data 
are all retrieved from the World Development Indicator.  The estimation is conducted using 
IV techniques with a country-specific dummy.     
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[Table  4  around here] 
  Empirical results are reported in Table 4
22
.   The coefficient of the interaction of 
deposit rates with financial development in Model 1 is negative.  As the scope for obtaining 
funds from capital markets increases, reliance on self-finance may be curtailed.  In Model 2 
and 3, the interaction between the real deposit rate and the upper-middle income group is 
shown to be negative, whereas that for the low-income countries is positive.  This implies 
that as the status of a developing country moves from the low to the middle income group, 
there is less self-financed investment.  These results are not surprising and explain why some 
empirical literature rejects the hypothesis.  For example, Fry (1978) finds that  money is not 
the only financial repository of domestic saving for the seven Asian semi-industrial LDCs.  
This is because these countries have achieved stages of financial development well beyond 
the phase in which the complementarity assumptions predominate
23
.  In the  empirical work 
for 25 Asian and Latin American LDCs, Gupta (1984) did not find strong support for the 
complemetarity hypothesis.  It is noted that some of the major Latin American countries in 
Gupta’s study are classified as being in the upper-middle income bracket.  
 The impact of FDI and ODA  in Model 4 also accords with a priori expectations, 
indicating that, as the external flows increase the amount of investment is raised, being 
independent of the complementarity hypothesis
24
.  Note that the effect of ODA on capital 
formation is weak, as the size of the coefficient is much smaller than that of FDI, and also in 
Model 5 and 6, the coefficient is not significant at the 5% level.  Generally, in order for ODA 
to affect output greatly, countries need to be equipped with reasonably well-developed 
institutions and legal systems.  Moreover, aid could be often misallocated into financing 
consumption expenditure by the government or reserve accumulation (in particular  when 
exchange rates are fixed), rather than increasing productive capital formation.  These factors 
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may, in part, explain the weak effect of ODA.  Public finance (Model 5) and trade openness 
(Model 6) have a positive and significant impact.   
 The robust finding is that d-πe is statistically significant, even when the investment 
model is conditioned.  It is, however, worth noting that there is a sharp decline in the 
magnitude of the coefficient, when such factors as external flows, trade and public finance 
are specified in the model as compared with that in Table 1.  In this respect, although the real 
rate of return on money matters in the creation of investment opportunities due to self-
financed capital formation, the complementarity hypothesis may be of limited practical value.  
Meanwhile, the robustness of the size of the coefficient of the credit can be observed, which 
remains mostly closer to the coefficient of 0.0018 in Table 1.   
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper has extensively tested McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis for 107 
developing countries using panel cointegration and IV econometric techniques.  The results 
show that the real rates of interest have a positive effect on money and investment, hence 
McKinnon’s emphasis on the importance of financial conditions in the development process 
is justified.  Our results substantiate the earlier findings for individual countries for self-
financed capital formation.  However, at the same time, we find that the effect weakens when 
the investment model is augmented with conditional variables.  Also, complemetarity is not 
supported in the middle-income group of countries, nor when a country reaches a certain 
stage of financial market development.  In this respect, one may have to look much farther 
down the development ladder, well below the middle-income level of developing economies, 
to the world’s least developed countries in order to recognise the complementarity theory.  
The evidence appears to highlight the strength of the credit link along with the role of 
financial intermediation
25
.  Under the disequilibrium interest rate system, which characterises 
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most developing countries, a decline in the real deposit rate of interest reduces real money 
demand, which affects real credit supply, and this, in turn, squeezes new fixed investment.  In 
either self-financed or bank-loan financed capital formation, the real rate of return on money 
greatly matters in raising the formation of capital, thereby increasing the rate of economic 
growth.  Policy makers for developing economies should continue to ensure a policy aimed at 
changing negative real interest rates to positive levels, or improve positive rates in order to 
secure greater levels of investment. 
 
 
APPENDIX  1    
107 developing countries (out of total 149) used for the empirical analysis 
Low-income economies (39) 
Bangladesh  India  Papua New Guinea 
Benin  Kenya  Rwanda  
Burkina Faso  Kyrgyz Republic  Senegal  
Burundi  Lao PDR  Sierra Leone  
Cambodia  Madagascar  Solomon Islands  
Central African Republic  Malawi  Sudan  
Chad  Mali  Tanzania  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mauritania  Togo  
Ethiopia  Mozambique  Uganda  
Gambia, The  Myanmar  Vietnam  
Ghana  Niger  Yemen, Rep.  
Guinea-Bissau  Nigeria  Zambia  
Haiti  Pakistan  Zimbabwe  
   
Lower-middle-income economies (38) 
Albania  Ecuador  Morocco 
Algeria  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Nicaragua  
Armenia  El Salvador  Paraguay  
Azerbaijan  Fiji  Peru  
Belarus  Georgia  Philippines  
Bhutan  Guatemala  Sri Lanka  
Bolivia  Guyana  Swaziland  
Cameroon  Honduras  Syrian Arab Republic  
Cape Verde  Indonesia  Thailand  
China  Jordan  Tunisia  
Colombia  Lesotho  Ukraine  
Congo, Rep.  Macedonia, FYR  Vanuatu  
Dominican Republic  Moldova   
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Upper-middle-income economies (30) 
Argentina  Grenada  Russian Federation  
Belize  Hungary  Serbia  
Botswana  Latvia  Seychelles  
Brazil  Libya  Slovak Republic  
Bulgaria  Lithuania  South Africa  
Chile  Malaysia  St. Kitts and Nevis  
Costa Rica  Mauritius  St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines  
Croatia  Mexico  Turkey  
Dominica   Panama Uruguay  
Gabon Poland Venezuela, RB  
 
Economies are divided according to 2006 GNI per capita,. Low income countries ($905 or less) 39 out of 53, 
Lower-middle income countries ($906-$3,595) 38 out of 55 countries and upper-middle income countries 
($3,596 -$11,115) 30 out of 41 countries (World Development Indicator). 
 
APPENDIX 2    
Descriptive statistics 
 m/p i/y dc y d-πe 
 Mean 20.755 -1.593 30.454 24.853 -3.140 
 Median 21.312 -1.585 21.877 25.575 0.547 
 Maximum 29.688 -0.193 234.180 35.154 231.427 
 Minimum 14.145 -4.337 -72.994 0.595 -298.95 
 Std. Dev. 3.497 0.476 30.261 4.667 22.858 
a. Sample period 1970-2006 with 107 countries.   
b. Observations 2050.    
c. d-πe :  The values above and below 300% are removed.    
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Table 1  Long-run IV model: Single and system equations  
Dependent var. Single System Dependent Var. Single System 
     m/p Coef s.e. Coef s.e.        i/y Coef s.e. Coef s.e. 
Constant -14.40904*** 0.70002 -1.15561*** 0.28134 Constant -1.62199*** 0.01730 -1.59951*** 0.01426 
y 1.39099*** 0.02691 0.86769*** 0.01056 d-πe 0.00542*** 0.00071 0.00425*** 0.00122 
i/y 0.16255*** 0.02950 0.19578** 0.08479 dc 0.00189*** 0.00046 0.00172*** 0.00030 
d-πe 0.00077** 0.00036 0.00027 0.00060      
R
2
 0.990  0.727   0.608  0.522  
Breusch-God (order=1) 1.3339  4.5767†   1.9018  2.0568  
Breusch-God. (order=2) 1.2503  5.1161   1.2513  1.2082  
Breusch-Pagan 1.7825  1.9247   2.3814  4.1219  
Sargan 1.0680  1.8904   5.4983  1.5579  
 
a. In the system of question, m/p and i/y models are simultaneously estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation. 
b. ***, ** and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.   
c. IV (instrument variables) in t-1: m/p, y, i/y, d-πe and dc for m equation and m/p, dc, i/y and d-πe for i/y equation.  
d. χ2  tests for Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation (AR), Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey hetroskedasticity, and Sargan over-identification.  † indicate significant at the 5% 
level.   
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Table 2     Selected studies of the complementary demand for money in developing economies  
 
 Countries Period  
(annual data) 
Model y d-πe i/y Estimation Methodology 
Table 1 
 
108 LDCs 
Panel data 
1970-2006 m/p 1.39099 0.00077 0.1625 Single IV 
“   m/p 0.86769 0.00027 § 0.1957 System IV 
“   i/y  0.00542  Single IV 
“   i/y  0.00425  System IV 
Pentecost and 
Moore (2006) 
India 1951-1999 m/p 0.448 0.057 0.683 System, Cointegration found 
 “   i/y  0.004  System, Cointegration found 
Odhiambo 
(2005) 
South Africa  m/p 0.45484 0.0106 0.19891 * OLS, Dynamic level feedback 
Khan and 
Hasan (1998) 
Pakistan 1959/60-
1994/95 
m/p 1.02 0.0015 § 1.97 * OLS, Cointegration found 
“   m/p 1.07 0.003   § 1.39 OLS, Cointegration found 
“   i/p  0.0005 §  OLS, Cointegration found 
Laumas 
(1990) 
India 1954/55-
19971/72 
m/p 
 
0.143 0.09   § 72.343  § System IV 
Time deposit instead of money 
“   i/y  0.014  System IV 
Thornton and 
Poudyal 
(1990) 
Nepal 1974/75-
1986/87 
m/p 1.1734 -0.0137 0.0708 * Single IV 
Thornton 
(1990) 
India 1964-1984 m/p 0.9235 -0.0039 1.0642 * Single IV 
        
 
a. IV: Instrumental variables.   
b. * Domestic saving (sd/y) specified instead of investment.   
c. §  Insignificant at the 5% level. 
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Table 3  Error correction dynamic model: IV model 
 
Dependent var.: 
Δ(m/p) coef s.e. 
Dependent var.: 
Δ(i/y) Coef. s.e. 
Constant 0.03286*** 0.00477 Constant -0.00729 0.00755 
et-1 -0.13385*** 0.01034 et-1 -0.29008*** 0.04187 
Δ(m/p)t-1 -0.04818** 0.02389 Δ (i/y)t-1 0.11346*** 0.04313 
Δy 0.52418*** 0.07317 Δ (d-πe) 0.00325** 0.00164 
Δyt-1 0.16080** 0.07353 Δ (d-π
e
)t-1 -0.00008 0.00039 
Δi/y 0.09109*** 0.02070 Δdc 0.02526*** 0.00558 
Δi/yt-1 -0.00353 0.02019 Δdct-1 -0.00834* 0.00454 
Δ (d-πe) 0.00140*** 0.00018    
Δ (d-πe)t-1 0.00098*** 0.00016    
R
2
 0.336   0.305  
Breusch-God. 
(order=1) 
3.8168   1.1350  
Breusch-God. 
(order=2) 
4.7459   3.2429  
Breusch-Pagan 6.0494   1.2313  
Sargan 7.1428   4.9235  
 
a. ***, ** and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.   
b. IV (instrument variables) in t-3and t-4 in levels: m/p, y, i/y  d-πe and dc in Δ(m/p) equation and m/p, dc, i/y 
and d-πe in  Δ (i/y) equation.  
c. χ2  tests for Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey hetroskedasticity, and Sargan over-
identification (none is significant at the 5% level). 
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Table 6   IV estimates of the augmented investment model: dependent variable i/y 
 
Model 1 s.e. Model 2 s.e. Model 3 s.e. 
Constant -1.61622*** 0.01872 -1.62912*** 0.01647 -1.58332*** 0.02083 
d-πe 0.01113*** 0.00344 0.00090** 0.00047 0.00943*** 0.00201 
dc 0.00220*** 0.00047 0.00194*** 0.00044 0.00126*** 0.00047 
d-πe *fd -0.00023*** 0.00008 
    d-πe *low 
  
0.00245*** 0.00074 
  d-πe *middle 
    
-0.02463*** 0.00985 
R
2
 0.583 
 
0.643 
 
0.491   
Breusch-God. 
(order=1) 
4.6410† 
 
1.0751 
 
2.0374 
 
Breusch-God. 
(order=2) 
4.3062 
 
1.0097 
 
1.9463 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
4.7350 
 
1.1776 
 
6.8591 
 
Sargan  
4.8290 
 
5.5083 
 
3.9790 
 
 
 
Model 4 s.e. Model 5 s.e. Model 6 s.e. 
Constant -1.67206*** 0.02021 -1.76481*** 0.03752 -1.96708*** 0.04643 
d-πe 0.00203*** 0.00060 0.00179*** 0.00060 0.00192*** 0.00060 
dc 0.00184*** 0.00044 0.00174*** 0.00045 0.00029 0.00044 
FDI 1.19250*** 0.21905 1.24639*** 0.21986 1.08370*** 0.20691 
ODA 0.35494** 0.16534 0.29919* 0.16633 0.26230 0.16835 
g 
    
0.00707*** 0.00239 0.00797*** 0.00244 
Trade 
        
0.00300*** 0.00039 
R
2
 0.663 
 
0.666 
 
0.673   
Breusch-God. 
(order=1) 
4.9517† 
 
4.941546† 
 
4.932963† 
 Breusch-God. 
(order=2) 
4.6512 
 
4.636248 
 
4.638195 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
4.2584 
 
5.16021 
 
6.091411 
 
Sargan  
4.7923 
 
4.7628 
 
4.5233 
 a. ***, ** and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
b. IV (instrument variables) in t-1: m/p, i/y and all regressors in each model.    
c. χ2  tests for Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey hetroskedasticity, and Sargan over-
identification.  † indicate significant at the 5% level.    
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ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1
 Shaw (1973) argues that complementarity has no place here because investors are not constrained to self-
finance.  Shaw took the debt-intermediation view by specifying a vector of real opportunity costs (real yields on 
all types of wealth) of holding money in equation (1). 
2
 McKinnon (1973) suggested using the average return on capital among firms.  However, it is not possible to 
compute such a unique rate of return, even for a single country (Laumas 1990).         
3
   We removed the observations of  real deposit rates, which exceeded 300% in absolute values.  The choice of 
300% is based on statistical performance. This has improved the numerical value of the coefficient of the real 
deposit rate, whilst the overall results remain to be similar to those with such extreme values.   
4
 Gross fixed capital formation includes plant, machinery, office, equipment purchases, private residential 
dwellings, commercial and industrial buildings and also the construction of roads, railways, schools and 
hospitals.  There is no data available exclusively for private investment for many of these developing countries.  
However, there exists disaggregated data for private and government consumption expenditures, respectively.  
Hence, we derive the private sector investment by taking the ratio of private sector consumption expenditure to 
total consumption expenditure (private and government sectors), as a weight on the gross fixed capital 
formation.  Although, the use of the weight may not accurately reflect the level of private investment, it may, 
broadly, exclude the governments’ element of capital formation.    
5
 In the preliminary estimation, we specified  inflation expectations by taking the moving average type of 
autoregressive expectation.  Also, some exercises, by taking a weight of the present and past inflation, were 
conducted.    However, these attempts were not quite successful, having poorly determined coefficients.  We 
stay with the naïve expectation.  
6
 In order to save space, the test results are not presented here, but available from the author upon request. 
7
 Dickey et al. (1994) argue that cointegration vectors may represent constraints on the movement of the 
variables in the system in the long-run, and consequently, the more cointegrating vectors there are, the more 
stable the system is.   
8
 Some empirical literature finds cointegration (see Table 2 in this paper) and claims it as compelling evidence 
of the complementarity hypothesis.  This overrates the findings.   
9
 The period effects are found to be insignificant by the likelihood ratio test, therefore we do not specify the 
period dummy.  It is possible that the regressors may capture some of the shifts in the economy over the sample 
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period.  In the next section, when the model is augmented, such period effects are more likely to be subsumed in 
the controlled variables, hence we do not give it much weight.   
10
 Note also that the use of lagged variables as instruments is said to be a weak procedure.  I thank one of the 
 
 referees of this journal for pointing this out.    
 
11
 Pedroni (1999 and 2004) proposes to allow for heterogeneous intercepts and trend coefficients across cross-
sections.  The Kao’s (1999) test specifies the cross-section specific intercepts and homogeneous coefficients 
across cross-sections, and sets all of the trend coefficients to zero.  The results are available from the author 
upon request.     
12
 See the selected studies in Table 11 in Moore et al. (2005) for the income elasticities of the demand for money 
for developing economies.  
13
 The monetary authorities may generate new credit independently of domestic saving often in response to 
government policy. 
14
 The supply of real credit is also determined by the balance of payments situation (Leff and Sato 1980). 
15
 One of the earliest empirical works is  in Fry (1978), who rejected the complementarity hypothesis for seven  
less-developed countries in Asia in a pooled regression.  Since Fry’s model specification and estimation 
techniques are different from those used in this paper, they are not listed in Table 2. 
16
 Much of the empirical literature is based on closed economies.  For exceptions, see Pentecost and Ramlogan 
(2000), who used two alternative measures of exchange rate misalignment in investigating the financial 
repression hypothesis for Trinidad and Tobago.  
17
 The variable of credit is combined with these variables, so that they capture the financial development in a 
wider range.  
18
 One may prefer to hold monetary assets only when it is felt convenient to keep ones’ wealth in monetary 
instruments with an underlying nature of liquidity, risk, return and efficiency in payment.  Such types of 
instruments are offered by a better-developed financial sector. 
19
 In the preliminary results, the group of lower-middle income countries performs poorly, hence we concentrate 
on low and upper-middle income groups.     
20
 See, for example, Bosworth and Collins (1999) for justification. 
21
 For example, Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) argue that the effectiveness of foreign capital on investment 
depends on the condition of public finances.   
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22
 The models, in general, tend to suffer a first-order serial correlation at the 5% level, but not at  the 1% level.  
The second-order serial correlation is not rejected at the 5% level in all cases. 
23
 In Fry’s (1978) study, three out of the seven countries are not even categorised as developing countries now.   
24
 Empirically, the impact of FDI on economic growth has remained controversial.  Our results are in line with 
those of Blomstrom et al. (1996), Balasubramanyan et al. (1999) and Borensztein et al. (1998), who observe a 
positive impact.   
25
 Indeed, McKinnon (1973) argued for the desirability of increasing the flow of credit through financial 
intermediaries in order to  raise the level of capital formation.   
